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Discussant's Response to 
A n Historical Perspective of Government Auditing 
With Special Reference to the U.S. General 
Accounting Office 
Richard E. Brown 
Kansas Legislative Post Auditor 
Critiquing Professor Herbert's paper is an assignment of great interest to me 
for a number of reasons. Some years ago while a doctoral student at Harvard 
University, I was literally forced by a professor to write a seminar paper on the 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Later I turned that paper into a doctoral disserta-
tion, and ultimately into one of the world's smallest selling books. Shortly after 
this I was a consultant to the G A O and, among other tasks, helped the G A O up-
date Senate Document 11: Financial Management in the Federal Government. 
And the relationship continues even now. The Kansas Legislative Division of 
Post Audit, the Kansas Legislature's audit agency which I head, is in reality a 
mini-GAO. Indeed the office was based on model legislation developed some years 
ago by the G A O . Like the G A O , my office performs a variety of audit work, in-
cluding both financial and performance auditing. The audit staff in Kansas, like 
that in the G A O , is a multidisciplinary audit staff. I could continue this analogy in 
many ways. 
Summary of Key Concepts In Paper 
Professor Herbert makes it very clear that his paper is a record of his own im-
pressions, a very personal account of government auditing and accounting, 
especially with regard to the G A O . He takes us from early voucher auditing, 
through balance sheet audits in the earlier days of the republic up to about 1920, 
and finally, with the G A O ' s creation in 1921, to the larger concerns of the pro-
fession with audits of financial statements and auditing with concern for generally 
accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards. Pro-
fessor Herbert mentions the 1945 Government Corporation Control Act, which 
made the G A O ' s audits of government corporations comparable to those of C P A 
firms, and he also discusses the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act to a limited ex-
tent. This latter piece of legislation mandated that the G A O should be the public 
accountant for all agencies and departments, and not only for government cor-
porations. In effect, this Act extends the 1945 lessons in commercial-type audits 
to all government entities, calling for on-site financial audits of all agencies. 
The paper discusses several other developments which occurred in the mid-
1950s, and it is important in this connection to keep in mind that Professor 
Herbert joined the staff of the G A O in 1956. According to Professor Herbert, of 
6,000 employees at that time, only 1,226 could be classified as accountants and 
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auditors. Of these, only 226 were "professionals." Moreover, "most of the 
agencies and departments of government," in Professor Herbert's words, "did 
not have an accounting system that would provide information that could in any 
way be said to be in accordance with G A A P . ' ' Thus, the G A O was unable to ex-
tend its financial auditing to all governmental entities in keeping with the thrust of 
the 1945 and 1950 legislation. And thus was born the term "comprehensive 
audit," the early term used by the G A O for a partial financial review, coupled 
with economy and efficiency audits of small parts of organizations. As Professor 
Herbert points out, Congress seemed pleased with the turn of events. Financial 
statement audits, according to the author, were eventually eliminated except for 
corporation audits. 
In the 1960s there was still a further shift in the audit work of the 
G A O . A congressional push toward effectiveness audit work developed. 
Professor Herbert states: " B y the end of the 1960s, G A O had practically 
divested itself of that punitive approach to auditing—reviews for legal com-
pliance, for errors in individual vouchers, and for efficiency and economy 
of individual actions . . . " The trend toward overall reviews for effec-
tiveness, according to the author, automatically brought about more con-
cern for the future than for what had happened in the past. 
Finally, Professor Herbert makes a few predictions for the future. He 
says that state and local governments will move to the same auditing mix 
as the G A O , that is, less auditing of financial statements and more 
auditing of program performance. He also feels that there will be a grow-
ing role for C P A firms in governmental auditing, including performance 
audit work, and that C P A firms will take the lessons they learn in their 
governmental practice to their audits of private sector firms, thereby ex-
panding the scope of the traditional financial audits performed there. Pro-
fessor Herbert also predicts fairly major and rapid changes in generally ac-
cepted accounting principles for government. Lastly, he concludes that 
while he is optimistic about the future of the profession, he is also a little 
fearful; fearful that if others "take over the newer fields of auditing, and 
financial statement auditing becomes less and less important, then what 
happens to the accounting and auditing profession?" 
A Differing V i e w of Events 
Reading Professor Herbert's account of the history of governmental 
accounting and auditing in America, and the G A O ' s influence on it, 
brings to mind the story of the three young boys watching a couple em-
bracing on the sofa: 
—The seven-year old says: "They're fighting.'' 
—The nine-year old says: "Don't be silly; they're making love.'' 
—The eleven-year old says: "Yes, and badly at that.'' 
In short, I view these same historical events quite differently. While I share 
Professor Herbert's concern for the future role of the profession, I believe the 
G A O has helped put us in this quandry. As I view the situation, the G A O , 
throughout its history, has made several key decisions the wrong way, and has 
failed to make some other decisions it should have made. 
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T o begin with, the G A O had a very slow start in American financial manage-
ment. The same 1921 Budget and Accounting Act which created the then 
Bureau of the Budget, also created the G A O . It is significant, however, that while 
the Bureau of the Budget proceeded rather rapidly to become a strong financial 
arm to the White House and to the Presidency, the same cannot be said of the 
G A O and its relationships to the U.S. Congress. The detailed on-site voucher 
checking and the associated attitude and atmosphere which permeated the early 
G A O lasted well into the 1940s. The more modern and broader view of auditing 
as a strong management and congressional tool of oversight did not take hold in 
the G A O until much later. Indeed, Professor Frederick C. Mosher writes in The 
GAO: The Quest for Accountability in American Government: 
The beginning of the transformation of the General Accounting Office 
coincided approximately with the conclusion of World War II . . . In 
1947, for example, the G A O : 
—Maintained 100,000 appropriation limitation accounts, 44,000 per-
sonal accounts with accountable officers, and about 270,000 other ac-
counts; 
—Countersigned 60,000 Treasury Department warrants and approved 
14,000 requisitions for disbursing funds; 
—Audited 93,000 accountable officers' accounts (containing 35 million 
vouchers), 5 million transportation vouchers, 1.5 million contracts, 
260 million postal money orders, 57 million postal notes, and 26 
million postal certificates; 
—Settled 108,000 accountable officers' accounts, 354,000 postmasters' 
accounts, and 773,000 claims; 
—Reconciled 490 million checks; 
—Issued 1,300 reports on inspections, surveys, and special investigation, 
made 6,200 replies to miscellaneous inquiries from members of Con-
gress, issued 400 reports to the President, Congress and to the Bureau 
of the Budget, and issued 7,400 decisions of the Comptroller General 
and 2,200 reports to the attorney general.1 
Indeed, one could argue that it is only in the last decade or so that the G A O 
has come into national prominence as a strong financial management tool of and 
in American government. 
Once having begun to become an effective force within government, there are 
scattered signs that the G A O may have moved too far, too quickly, and perhaps 
even in the wrong directions to gain recognition. As indicated above, the 1945 
Corporation Control Act, coupled with the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act, 
were expected to extend commercial-type, financial statement audits to all entities 
of government. In essence, this would have entailed an audit of the financial 
statements of governmental entities, and in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, leading to an opinion that the statements were fairly presented 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. This development, 
however, has not occurred. Professor Herbert's data suggests that a lack of 
qualified staff, a lack of adequate accounting systems, and congressional disinterest 
are the culprits. Out of this period came the "comprehensive audit.'' While I am 
not entirely certain exactly what this audit is, it is certainly a very partial financial 
audit. 
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A glimpse of the division of audit effort today in the G A O is most revealing. 
Professor Mosher presents the following data in his study.2 
Percentages of G A O Work by Program Category 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Financial 14 13 14 12 11 10 
Economy & 
Efficiency 56 53 54 52 49 41 
Program 
Results 30 34 32 36 40 49 
Source: The GAO's monthly "Overview Report." 
The bottom line is that ten percent of the G A O ' s audit effort in 1977 was 
devoted to financial auditing while 90 percent was spent on performance auditing, 
including efficiency and program results work. It is difficult to reconcile this situa-
tion with recent financial problems and crises in American government. It is also 
puzzling, given recent actions by the Federal government, through its Federal 
Revenue Sharing Act and through the Office of Management and Budget Circular 
A-102, Attachment P, to in effect mandate that all state and local units of govern-
ment receiving substantial amounts of federal funds receive audits conducted in 
accordance with G A A S , of financial statements basically prepared on the basis of 
G A A P . One can not help wonder why, if this is such a good idea for state and 
local units of American government, the G A O has not found it necessary to work 
toward this same end in the Federal government. Moreover, it is worth noting 
that both of these efforts to bring about uniformity and accountability in Ameri-
can financial management have come through executive agencies, the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Department of Treasury, and not through the 
nation's audit agency, the G A O . A t this very moment, as a variety of prestigious 
study groups are attempting to revise the concept of generally accepted ac-
counting principles for American government, and while there seems to be a 
determination to ensure that state and local units of government are brought into 
compliance with such accounting and related audit requirements, there seems to 
be an equal determination that the Federal government itself shall not be covered 
by such requirements. 
If there are difficulties with this end of the audit spectrum, the same could cer-
tainly be said of the other end of the audit spectrum—that relating to performance 
auditing. The G A O ' s movement to program evaluation occurred swiftly in the 
1960's and 1970's. Yet we find Professor Herbert writing: 
I have always made a distinction between program auditors and pro-
gram analysts or program evaluators. The auditor must be independent in 
order to render an independent conclusion or opinion. The analyst does 
not necessarily have to be independent or even unbiased. His way, in his 
opinion, should be the only way to go, even if it is biased. Yet, without an 
independent audit on the way he chose to go, whether the right way or the 
wrong way, third parties would have no way of knowing whether he chose 
the right or wrong way. 
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Program evaluation does indeed seem to be different than performance 
auditing in a few crucial ways. We can not pursue these differences in any depth 
here, but their existence and their importance is raised in a volume by Sar A . 
Levitan and Gregory Wurzburg, Evaluating Federal Social Programs: An Uncer-
tain Art: 
By insisting on preserving its independence and, in particular, failing 
to adequately acknowledge other literature and incorporate it where ap-
propriate, the G A O divisions that do the vast majority of the social pro-
gram evaluations may be forcing their work into a strait jacket that 
reduces the effectiveness of their work. G A O tends to ignore the 
legislative and administrative agendas behind social legislation and over-
simplify the reality in which social programs are implemented. The work 
rarely questions the practicality of congressional mandates and pays too lit-
tle attention to the inevitable difficulties inherent in the implementation of 
social policies. 
The insistence upon independence for financial auditing is, of course, 
justified. But elsewhere, the limitations this puts on G A O reduce the 
usefulness of its products. The benefit of independence in evaluating the 
complexities and nuances of intricate social programs is ambiguous at 
best. . . 3 
Much needs to be done to establish that performance auditing is still auditing, 
and, due to its volatile nature, independence will become more and not less impor-
tant. More significantly, according to Professor Herbert, the G A O ' s effectiveness 
work necessitates a futuristic view. I do not agree with such an assessment, and 
the implications are serious. The G A O is in danger of becoming a "think tank" 
for the Congress—doing much work which is similar to that conducted by con-
sulting houses, the Legislative Reference Service, and the Congressional Budget 
Office—and not an audit organization at all. (One person's definition of a policy 
analyst, incidentally, is a scholar who really wants to be governor or president but 
does not want to bother running for office or hold that kind of responsibility.) Pro-
fessor Mosher concludes in his book that the " G A O has stretched its meaning of 
the word 'audits' beyond anything contemplated twenty years ago, and some of 
its work—an increasing share—can hardly fit within that rubric, however it is 
defined.'' One must question using the cloak of auditing, and the power and tradi-
tion normally associated with that term, to look not at past actions and per-
formance of management, but instead to conducting future-oriented studies, 
analyses, and evaluations. In the wrong hands this becomes a method to use the 
power of auditing to second-guess elected representatives in a democratic system 
and perhaps even to wield their authority for them. Ultimately, such an approach 
may discredit government auditing of all kinds, whether financial or performance. 
In any event, there would seem to be other organizations around capable of doing 
such future-oriented analyses. 
There is one final substantive comment that I would make on the content of 
the paper by Professor Herbert. That relates to the almost total lack of discussion 
of the vital role played by others in the evolution of government auditing over the 
last several decades. Nearly all developments are attributed to the U.S. General 
Accounting Office and the Federal government. Of course state officials grow ac-
customed to this, and officials from small states learn especially fast. Let me 
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merely indicate that the American states are also involved in a leadership role in 
this area, and are certainly up with the G A O in matters relating to progressive 
auditing. 
Item: performance auditing. Lennis Knighton's classic doctoral dissertation 
and book in the mid-1960s on The Performance Post Audit In State Govern-
ment, makes it clear that the performance audit movement was well under way in 
the states at that time. Performance auditing is presently conducted in a number 
of states and is quite good. This work is presently as well done as that of the G A O , 
is probably presented to decision makers on a more timely basis, and has a con-
siderable amount of impact. 
Item: financial auditing. Financial auditing is done more frequently at the state 
level, practicing in effect what the "feds'' are preaching. 
Item: organizational advancements. Pressures for a national state auditors 
association, for the national system of intergovernmental audit forms, and for 
quality review have resulted as much from the pressures by state audit groups as 
from a leadership effort by the U.S. General Accounting Office. 
Conclusions 
In closing, let me return to Professor Herbert's predictions for the future. He 
states that state and local governments will move toward the same mix of audit 
work as the G A O . He must therefore mean that state and local entities will do less 
financial auditing and more effectiveness—including futuristic—kinds of studies. 
M y assessment would be that this development is unlikely, given the varied 
federal laws and regulations which now exist and which in effect mandate a dif-
ferent kind of audit emphasis. Moreover, I personally do not believe state audit 
agencies should follow the G A O lead any longer in this matter. While state 
legislators are very interested in performance auditing and, indeed, are demanding 
such audits more than ever, it appears they are interested in performance auditing 
as an add-on to basic financial audit work, and not as a substitute for it. They seem 
far more concerned over auditing and assessing past performance than in using 
auditors to try to read the future. 
Professor Herbert states that C P A firms will play a greater role in governmen-
tal auditing, including performance audit work, and that the lessons they learn in 
government will be brought into the corporate audit work that they conduct. I 
believe that this is probably a reasonable assessment of what is occurring in Kan-
sas, as well as in a number of other states in America. This is so in large measure 
due to the recent requirements placed on state audit organizations by the federal 
government. It is unlikely that state audit staffs will be allowed to expand rapidly 
enough to themselves conduct all the required financial audit work. It should be 
noted, however, that C P A firms are unlikely to learn to conduct high-quality per-
formance work in the near future. On one recent occasion one of the Big 8 public 
accounting firms was considering hiring me as a consultant to prepare a brochure 
on performance auditing for the firm. The effort was finally aborted by a national 
partner who feared that "someone might read the brochure and actually believe 
that his firm could do performance audit work!'' 
And finally, Professor Herbert fears that if others "take over the newer fields 
of auditing, and financial statement auditing becomes less and less important, then 
what happens to the accounting and auditing profession?" I share Professor 
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Herbert's concern in this regard. "Others"—the evaluators, the analysts—are 
indeed trying to take over the new fields of auditing. This trend, however, is in 
large measure due to a lack of forward-looking leadership by the G A O , the 
American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, and most others who have an important role and stake in this mat-
ter. Apparently they are too easily satisfied that these newer kinds of auditing are 
simply not auditing at all, and so do not want to be involved. A n d thus, policy and 
decision makers are looking outside the auditing profession for the conduct of 
modern audit work, and these groups generally do not have the all-important 
traditions and guidelines of auditing to see them through. 
Our professional societies and related groups must begin to be more respon-
sive and imaginative, and begin to bring such new techniques and developments 
into the well-established audit fold. A related issue today is the fact that there is 
less interest in financial auditing by decision makers at a time when this should 
not and need not be the case. Again, however, in my view much of the blame for 
this development must be directed to our professional leadership organizations, in-
cluding the G A O . Through their attention—their research priorities and their 
decisions—these groups have failed to persuade public officials that financial 
auditing is important and, coupled with the newer forms of auditing, can indeed 
provide a valuable service to them and to the taxpayers of this country. 
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